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# ESDP: A UK Perspective

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# ESDP: A UK Perspective

- Britain & ESDP
- The Threat
- How ESDP can help
- Overall Context




## UK Role in ESDP

- Saint-Malo summit, 1998
- EU Presidency 2005 - 5 ESDP Missions launched on 3 continents
- Capabilities initiative - e.g. Helicopters
- Dec 2008: Provision of OHQ and Op Cdr for Operation ATALANTA (Piracy)





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## “New” Context:

- Terrorism
- WMD Proliferation
- Organised Crime
- Failed and Fragile States
- Climate Change
- Energy Security
- Globalisation  
(unmanaged migration)



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
# So what is the solution?

- “Comprehensive approach”
- Multi-lateral institutions
- Capabilities

# The Conflict Cycle



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## EU AND NATO: Rivals?

The EU and NATO will continue to be complementary, thriving on the value added by each organisation:

- NATO is an organisation for collective defence which unites North America and Europe, in particular when faced with the risk of major aggression. The Alliance must also provide a response to the diverse new threats that face the allies.
- The European Union is unique in that it has the capability of mobilizing a full range of crisis management tools: military, humanitarian, diplomatic and financial to serve the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The EU must not be considered as the civilian agency of NATO; it is a full-fledged participant in crisis.

*French White Paper on Defence and National Security,  
June 2008*

# The Wider Context



**NATO:** 26,000 of ISAF

**UN:** roughly 50% of UNIFIL II (15,000)

Also **OSCE, national operations...**

1995-2007: No of European troops on operations rose from 39,000 to 71,000

*“A narrow focus on ESDP...divert[s] attention from the true nature of European contribution to international security”*



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Thank you



# EUROPEAN CAPABILITIES A UK PERSPECTIVE

Sandy Johnston  
UK Ministry of Defence



# Capability



Nations need to generate and make available to NATO and the EU the military and civilian capabilities needed to meet today's security challenges

- As one of 21 countries who are both Allies in NATO and Member States of the European Union, the UK looks at the overall picture of European capabilities not in terms of EU capabilities or NATO capabilities, but as a single set of forces that belong to the countries concerned. These forces can be made available, when necessary and in the context of unanimous agreement in the organisation concerned, for EU or NATO-led operations. This remains one of the key challenges in both the EU and NATO. One of the main aims behind the UK's participation in the initiative at Saint-Malo was to harness the European political dynamic to see if partners would do more for Europe than they have done for NATO. But we don't need more institutional capability, we need countries to develop forces and assets that are usable for both the EU or NATO; or indeed coalitions of the willing.
- In view of the complex challenges that we face in places like Afghanistan and Kosovo, it is important to pay attention also to the requirement for civilian capabilities in order to be able to adopt a truly comprehensive approach to crisis management and stabilisation missions.





## • Learning the lessons from NRF and EUFOR CHAD force generation

- UK ideas for an “Allied Solidarity Force” now subsumed into wider strategy for the NRF
- Continued support to the EU BG initiative:
  - a means of improving burden-sharing
  - a transformation driver

- The NATO Response Force and EU battlegroups demonstrate political willingness to generate on-call forces to respond to crises. But we now need to look at the issues that have arisen in generating NRF force elements – in particular why it is that, having signed up politically to the concept, countries are failing to back it with concrete force contributions. Ministers last week reaffirmed their commitment to the NRF, which now incorporates the aims and objectives of the “Allied Solidarity Force” idea floated by the UK.
- Similarly, when the EU decided to launch an operation in CHAD last year, five force generation conferences failed to produce sufficient forces for the operation. And we are still struggling to find sufficient Maritime Patrol Aircraft assets to fill the ATALANTA requirement despite the numbers declared to the Headline Goal.
- The EU battlegroups have yet to be tested, but similar questions apply over the extent to which expressions of political will are backed up by credible capability – adequate funding and provision of enablers are crucial to effectiveness.





• Support the development of the European Defence Agency.

- A sensible “Long Term Vision” for the EU’s capability needs.

Creation of the EDA suggests that EU Member States are keen to find opportunities for collaboration, with the benefits that brings. The Long Term vision provides a clear perspective on what the EU needs to achieve. There are still yawning gaps between the level of ambition that Europeans have set themselves and the reality of equipment levels. Strategic airlift, helicopters, C2, UAVs, smart munitions, AAR, CSAR still all show chronic shortfalls.

Time will tell whether partners will be able to increase, or at least maintain defence budgets and whether they are prepared to spend existing budgets more effectively through modernisation, downsizing and collaboration. Needless to say, the global financial downturn will not help in this respect.

But building institutions is no substitute for developing improved capability. The Agency needs to remain focused on outputs and added value, rather than on increasing staff numbers and budgetary growth at a time when Member States are having to trim their own Defence budgets.





- Improving European nations' expeditionary capability, especially strategic airlift and helicopters
- Other important areas for capability development include medical support, logistics

It is significant that in two of the key areas in which progress has been made during the last ten years, the initiative has come not from the institutions themselves, but from individual Member States. Strategic lift and helicopters are indispensable if the Europeans are to be able to carry out effective deployments, but they are not the only shortfalls in the requirements catalogue. We would like to see other Member States coming forward with proposals for filling gaps including the willingness to fund projects in some of the less high-profile areas such as medical support.





## • Better harmonisation of EU and NATO planning processes

- We should recognise the need for closer co-operation between the EU and NATO in the area of capability planning. 21 Member States are also full members of the Alliance, with a further 5 participating in Partnership for Peace.
- The two organisations are obviously different, with distinct and autonomous decision-making processes – this will not change.
- But it is only logical that they should both share the same understanding of the capabilities owned by the European countries, which might be available for operations led by either organisation.
- Notwithstanding their different levels of ambition, many of the shortfalls are common to both organisations. It does not make sense to have parallel projects and processes running in both systems, duplicating staff and resource costs that we all have to pay for.
- The UK has joined other partners in deciding to send its NATO Defence Planning Questionnaire to the EU in order to encourage a more co-ordinated approach by the two organisations. There are obstacles to effective working in this way, both political and institutional, but we are convinced that it is the right approach for the long term.





- Civilian capabilities indispensable for the comprehensive approach

- Generating and maintaining numbers of available policemen, judges, lawyers, administrators raises different problems
- Integrated planning fundamental to effectiveness

Delivery of the comprehensive approach to crisis management and stabilisation, which should be the trademark of the EU, requires the development and maintenance of sufficient numbers of civilian personnel with the right training, experience and skills to contribute.

This brings a different set of problems. Military forces are trained and held in readiness against requirements, filling time between deployments with training, ceremonial duties etc. Civilians have a different pattern of employment and tend to be in full time jobs, unless recently retired.

Databases are maintained of available experts in various fields who are prepared to volunteer for deployment on civilian operations, but quality control is an important consideration.

Integrated planning is a crucial precursor to effective civ-mil operations, and it is likely that almost all EU-led operations will in future involve both military and civilian elements. The establishment of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate in Brussels, drawing together the military and civilian planning staffs, will be a major step in the right direction.



# Conclusions

- EU
  - Civil - military co-ordination
  - Working with others
- NATO
  - Confidence and leadership in operations
  - Transformation and reform
- Coalitions v institutions

So, what conclusions can we draw? Let me suggest a few.

NATO is now thoroughly immersed in Afghanistan, building on operational experience gained in the Balkans. It needs now to make a success of the campaign, including the more challenging aspects. It remains to be seen whether the Alliance has the will and the resources – and perhaps most importantly whether it can develop the political flexibility and speed of reaction - to see the mission through.

The EU has enjoyed a measure of success in running operations, both military and civilian, across three continents but is still not getting the best out of its potential to deploy military and civilian instruments coherently alongside each other. And the two organisations need to become better at working together, recognising each others' relative strengths. They both need to work with the UN and with other sub-regional organisations in Africa and elsewhere, in managing emerging crises as well as conflict and post-conflict situations.

European capabilities remain in short supply, despite grandiose statements of political will. Unless governments are prepared to modernise and to invest in deployable, sustainable and interoperable forces, as well as the necessary civilian capabilities, the EU's level of ambition will not be fully supported by credible capability and the US will continue to shoulder the bulk of NATO's burden as in the past, with the UK and France doing the same in the EU.

In Afghanistan, Iraq, the Balkans, Africa and in the fight against piracy off Somalia – we see the sometimes uneasy relationship between coalitions of the willing, and established international security organisations – often enjoying overlapping membership. We need to think through whether the coalition approach – in all probability a US-led coalition – is the template for future international interventions, or whether NATO and the EU can evolve – or survive - to take on leadership roles in line with their relative strengths. The answer will be provided at least in part by NATO's success or otherwise in Afghanistan, and by the Europeans' performance in matching political rhetoric with genuine capability.

